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A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE OF
RELIGION'S VIEWS OF THE LAW OF
CHURCH AND STATE
THE KINGSHIP OF CHRIST: WHY FREEDOM OF
"BELIEF" IS NOT ENOUGH
Stanley Hauerwas*
Michael Baxter, C.S.C.**
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION: THE PREVALENCE OF "MERE
BELIEF"
In addressing matters of church and state, Christian theologians
in America by and large have assumed that it is their task to justify
the First Amendment. We do not intend to take up that task in this
Essay; indeed, we intend to do quite the opposite. We intend to show
that the theoretical presuppositions and concrete practices under-
writing the so-called separation of church and state have produced a
set of political arrangements (i.e., the United States of America)
that present a deep and intractable challenge to that community
whose allegiance is first and foremost to the Kingship of Christ (i.e.,
"the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church"). We intend to show,
in other words, that the relation between church and state is marked
by conflict and that Christian theologians make a profound mistake
when they posit some kind of harmony between the two by means of
a so-called church-state theory.
A most revealing, and disturbing, version of such church-state
theory was recently put forth in a syndicated column by George
Will.' The column focuses on the Supreme Court's ruling in Em-
* Professor of Theological Ethics, The Divinity School, Duke University.
** Reverend Michael Baxter, C.S.C. is a graduate student in the graduate program of religion
at Duke University. He is currently writing his dissertation on Catholic Historiography in
America with particular reference to the role of John Courtney Murray. Rev. Baxter co-authored
this Essay, however, he did not participate in the Conference.
1. George F. Will, Conduct, Coercion, Belief, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 22, 1990, at B7.
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ployment Division v. Smith.2 Briefly, the case involved two Oregon
men, both Native Americans, who were fired from their jobs for
ingesting small amounts of the hallucinogen peyote and were then
denied unemployment benefits.' The men argued that peyote is sac-
ramental in the Native American Church and that, on the basis of
the First Amendment prohibition of laws "prohibiting the free exer-
cise" of religion, they should not be penalized for using it.4 The
Court sent the decision back to the state with the affirmation -that
the Oregon Department of Human Resources has no obligation to
pay benefits to the men if they had actually violated state law; the
fact that they had used the peyote in religious worship was not
relevant.5
In his column, Will commends Justice Scalia, author of the ma-
jority opinion, for upholding the lower court rulings that denied un-
employment benefits to Smith and Black, but then he argues that
Scalia did not go far enough. Specifically, Will adverts to a 1972
Supreme Court decision that exempted children of the Old Order
Amish, on free exercise grounds, from having to comply with Wis-
consin law requiring parents to send their children to school until
age 16, and he contends that Scalia should also have struck down
that decision. Scalia missed an opportunity to set the record
straight, says Will; he could have reasserted the distinction that lies
at the heart of the constitutional understanding of "religion" - the
distinction between "conduct" and "mere belief."6
In elaborating on the importance of the distinction between con-
duct and mere belief, Will spins out a story that is at once familiar
and sobering. The Founders of the American Republic "wished to
tame and domesticate religious passions of the sort that convulsed
Europe. They aimed to do so not by establishing religion but by
establishing a commercial republic - capitalism. They aimed to
submerge people's turbulent energies in self-interested pursuit of
material comforts." The hero of Will's story is "the patron saint of
libertarians - Saint Thomas. No, not Thomas Aquinas - Thomas
2. 474 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. Id. at 874.
4. Id. at 878.
5. Id. at 890. A complicating factor in this case was that the men were employed as counselors
at a drug and alcohol abuse center called ADAPT (the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment), whose rules explicitly proscribe the use of illegal drugs
by employees.
6. Will, supra note 1, at B7.
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Jefferson." It was Jefferson who "held that 'operations of the mind'
are not subject to legal coercion, but that 'acts of the body' are.
Mere belief, said Jefferson, in one god or 20, neither picks one's
pockets nor breaks one's legs." As Will explains it, Jefferson's dis-
tinction between conduct and mere belief "rests on Locke's principle
• . . that religion can be useful or can be disruptive, but its truth
cannot be established by reason. Hence Americans would not 'estab-
lish' religion. Rather, by guaranteeing free exercise of religions, they
would make religions private and subordinate." 7
It is with this business of making "religions private and
subordinate" that Will's familiar story becomes sobering. Will
writes that "[a] central purpose of America's political arrangements
is the subordination of religion to the political order, meaning the
primacy of democracy." This means that "religion is to be perfectly
free as long as it is perfectly private - mere belief - but it must
bend to the political will (law) as regards conduct."8 Ingesting pe-
yote, teaching children in the home, and any other form of religious
conduct thus goes unprotected by the Constitution, and Will thinks
this is a good thing. Why? Because even though some religious con-
duct must be restricted (quoting Scalia, Will refers to this as " 'an
unavoidable consequence of democratic government' "), this is far
more preferable (and here he quotes Scalia again)" 'to. a system in
which conscience is a law unto itself' "; because, in other words, it
avoids anarchy. Will contends that the genius of the Founders was
that they "favored religious tolerance because religious pluralism
meant civil peace - order." So, in spite of the laxity displayed with
regard to the Old Order Amish children, Will commends Scalia for
confining the free exercise of religion to "mere belief" and for al-
lowing the restriction of religious "conduct." "To understand the
philosophic pedigree of Scalia's sensible position," Will maintains,
"is to understand the cool realism and secularism of the philosophy
that informed the Founders." Thus, he states in conclusion that
"Scalia's position is not only sound conservatism, it is constitution-
ally correct: It is the intent of the Founders." 9
It is a secondary matter to us whether or not it was "the intent of
the Founders" to "make religion private and subordinate," as Will
suggests. We believe that in either case, this is what has taken
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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place, at least as regards Christianity. Christianity in America is
"private and subordinate"; it has succumbed to "a central purpose
of America's political arrangements" (i.e., the subordination of reli-
gion to the political order, meaning the primacy of democracy). But
whereas George Will celebrates this achievement, we think it is dis-
astrous. Moreover, we find it ironic (to say the least) that theolo-
gians in America have entered into this conspiracy to privatize and
subordinate Christianity. The conspiracy operates whenever theolo-
gians acquiesce in the assumption (so vividly articulated by Will)
that Christianity consists of a set of beliefs (mere belief) that can be
abstracted from practices and actions (conduct). Part and parcel of
this assumption is the notion that in America we are "free" because
we are permitted to "believe" anything we want to, just so long as
we do not assume that our beliefs can be embodied. The problem
with this notion is that "belier' gets confined to an asocial sphere of
interiority (e.g., Jefferson's "operations of the mind") in such a way
that "freedom" pertains solely to that entity of liberal subjectivity
called "the individual" and never to the only body wherein for
Christians true belief resides, the body of believers called "the
Church."
The usual question that theologians and others take up at this
point is the interminable one concerning whether the first clause of
the First Amendment, "Establishment," is subordinate to the second
clause, "Free Exercise," or vice versa. But we wish to avoid this
tack, for when the issue is construed in terms of the First Amend-
ment, the prior questions of the meaning of "freedom" and the
meaning of "religion" are too often overlooked. We do not believe
that freedom in and of itself is a good. Indeed, we do not believe
that freedom, in and of itself, even exists. And the term "religion" is
even more problematic in that it usually implies that the service and
worship of God can be meaningfully discussed without specifying
the identity of God, who God is, which god is being worshiped. In
this sense, Christians are not "religious" in any general sense;
rather, Christians are the people who acknowledge the Kingship of
Christ. So we are dubious about the intelligibility of "freedom of
religion," especially when it is put forth as the centerpiece of a polit-
ical project such as the United States of America.
In order to make our case, we are going to bring together a most
unlikely set of political and intellectual allies: Stanley Fish, John
Courtney Murray, and Pope Pius XI. We advert to the work of
Vol. 42:107
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Stanley Fish because Fish has helped us to see how all claims to
"freedom" must inevitably be constrained when it comes to political
practice; to John Courtney Murray because his work was more am-
biguous than is usually supposed; and to Pius XI because he re-
minds us that Christians must acknowledge Christ's Kingship not
only in belief but in practice, lest they find themselves worshiping
foreign gods. By attending to this variety of perspectives on freedom
and the good, we hope to show why the problem of "church-state
relations" affords no real resolution.
II. low "FREE SPEECH" DEGENERATES INTO INDIFFERENCE
ABOUT SPEECH
In an article entitled There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and
It's a Good Thing, Too,10 Stanley Fish delivers a simple, straight-
forward point: Free speech cannot be a good in and of itself.'1 In
introducing his argument, Fish points out that while defenders of
free speech often buttress their assertions with a quote from
Milton's Areopagitica, where the virtues of toleration and unregu-
lated speech are extolled, they seldom take note of the way in which
Milton "catches himself up short and says, of course I didn't mean
Catholics, them we exterminate."' 2 Fish notes that in excluding
Catholics, Milton was not stipulating the single exception to an oth-
erwise universal principle. 3 Rather, Milton was simply doing what
any defender of free speech is compelled to do; he was pointing to
possible future scenarios in which freedom of speech would have to
be checked for the sake of the overriding ends of the community
(which in this case would not countenance seventeenth-century Brit-
ish notions of evil, impiety, and bad manners). Fish thus expands
what he sees in Milton into a general observation:
Speech, in short, is never and could not be an independent value, but is
always asserted against a background of some assumed conception of the
good to which it must yield in the event of conflict. When the pinch comes
10. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too, in
DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 231
(Paul Berman ed., 1992).
11. Id. at 233.
12. Id. at 231-32. Milton's qualifier reads: "'I mean not tolerated popery, and open supersti-
tion, which as it extirpates all religious supremacies, so itself should be extirpated . . . that also
which is-impious or evil absolutely against faith or manners no law can possibly permit that in-
tends not to unlaw itself.'" Id. (quoting John Milton, Areopagitica).
13. Id. at 232.
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(and sooner or later it will always come) and the institution (be it church,
state, or university) is confronted by behavior subversive of its core ration-
ale, it will respond by declaring "of course we mean not tolerated -,
that we extirpate"; not because an exception to a general freedom has sud-
denly and contradictorily been announced but because the freedom has
never been general and has always been understood against the background
of an originary exclusion that gives it meaning.'
4
Hence the first half of the article's title: There's No Such Thing as
Free Speech ....
Fish notes that one way we have managed not to acknowledge
this plain, unavoidable reality is by creating laws which posit a dis-
tinction between speech and action, the assumption being that
speech is inconsequential unless and until it translates into some
form of action. 15 And then, within this distinction, legal theorists
fashion yet a further distinction. In Fish's words, "Some forms of
speech are not really speech because they have a tendency to incite
violence; they are, as the court declares in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire (1941), 'fighting words,' words 'likely to provoke the av-
erage person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.' "I' The difficulty with the fighting words notion, of course, is
that utterances which for one group are fighting words are for an-
other group quite innocuous." Thus, it becomes virtually impossible
to determine, in the abstract, what constitutes fighting words. The
point is this: There is no such thing as speech alone, speech in and
of itself, speech separate from action (or conduct).' 8 Better it is,
Fish suggests, to view the entire matter in terms of consequential
and inconsequential behavior (i.e., speech and/or action)."
In his essay, Fish is trying to relieve us of the false notion that
free speech is curtailed only in abnormal contexts. In actuality, the
case is quite the opposite. Only in abnormal contexts is free speech
not curtailed. What contexts? Fish lists two, on streetcorners in
Hyde Park and on radio talk shows.2" The extraordinary thing about
these contexts is that they are artificially designed for people to say
what they want exactly because what they say does not matter." In
14. Id. at 233.
15. Id. at 235.
16. Id. at 236.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19, Id. at 235.
20, Id. at 237.
21, Id.
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contrast, most of our speech does matter, does carry consequences,
does make a difference. The problem with appealing to "free
speech" as an absolute is that it reduces speech to the level of radio
talk show prattle. It makes speech a matter of indifference.
Fish points out how this notion that speech is inconsequential, a
matter of indifference, works to the detriment of those who are on
the losing end of society's political power games. It works like this.
Defenders of free speech (Fish cites Benno Schmidt) maintain that
the solution to, for example, racial epithets is not to restrict speech
but to counter those epithets with more speech.22 Therefore, the key
task is to construct a setting in which harmful speech can be can-
celed out by additional speech, a marketplace of ideas where speech
is freely exchanged according to its worth. But we should note, Fish
insists, that for defenders of free speech, "The idea that the effects
of speech can penetrate to the core - either for good or for ill - is
never entertained; everything is kept on the level of weightless ver-
bal exchange; there is no sense of the lacerating harms that speech
of certain kinds can inflict."' 2 This could work, Fish argues, "only if
the pain and humiliation caused by racial or religious epithets could
be ameliorated by saying something like 'So's your old man.' ",24
Fish's point, again, is that "expression is more than a matter of
proffering and receiving propositions, that words do work in the
world of a kind that cannot be confined to a purely cognitive realm
of 'mere' ideas." 25
We find Fish's argument particularly helpful in showing how the
constitutional principles of "freedom of speech," when fused with
the notion that speech is inconsequential, that speech in and of itself
consists of "mere speech," too often serve as a rhetorical cover for
the most venomous of ideologies. 26 A recent controversy on the cam-
22. Id. at 239-40.
23. Id. at 240,
24. Id.
25. Id. at 240-41.
26. In an earlier draft of his essay, Fish presses his case by exposing the remarkable inconsis-
tency of those who currently criticize "political correctness" on the basis of free speech. He calls
attention to the way Time magazine covers matters of free speech in a way that is contradictory,
if not downright duplicitous. In the April 1, 1991 issue, Time asks its readers to imagine a place
"where it is considered racist to speak of the rights of the individual when they conflict with the
community's prevailing opinion"; and then launches into a familiar, by now well-worn, critique of
antiharassment codes. William A. Henry Ill, Upside Down in the Groves of Academe, TIME, Apr.
1, 1991, at 66. Fish then notes, with irony, that it is something of a surprise when in the same
issue one reads a report of a French anti-Semite who, after having characterized the Nazi gas
chambers as a mere "detail of history," was sued by a group of Holocaust survivors and ordered to
19921
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pus of Duke University illustrates what we mean. In the fall of
1991, the student newspaper, The Chronicle, ran an advertisement
by a group called the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust.
The ad declared that the Holocaust never happened and alleged that
the standard historical reporting of the Holocaust has been the
product of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy designed to gain support
for the creation of a Jewish homeland. The ad also called for "open-
ness" to this "revisionist" interpretation of the Holocaust. On the
day the ad appeared, the student editors also ran an editorial de-
fending their decision to publish the ad in the name of "the spirit of
freedom of speech." A spate of commentary and controversy ensued,
in the midst of which it was pointed out that the editorial policy had
been inconsistent; the editors accepted the Holocaust ad in spite of
its abhorrent content, whereas months before they had rejected an
advertisement for Playboy magazine because they did not want to
encourage young women to expose their bodies to soft core pornog-
raphy. The point was well-taken. What was at work in the editors'
logic? The Playboy ad was forbidden because it promoted the deg-
radation of bodies; the Holocaust ad was approved because it dealt
in the realm of "ideas."
What was at work here was more than a matter of a terribly shal-
low understanding of the deleterious power of speech and ideas
(though it was at least that). More troubling was the way the edi-
tors assumed an understanding of "freedom" whereby "speech" and
pay a fine of $180,000. Comeuppance For a Bigot, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991, at 50. Time commends
this decision, accuses him of circulating "inflammatory rhetoric," and gives the story the headline,
Comeuppance For a Bigot. Id. Now what is the difference, Fish asks, between putting a muzzle
on an anti-Semite in France and putting a stop to racist rhetoric on college campuses? And then
he gives this answer:
What appears to be a contradiction in logical terms makes perfect sense once the
issue is reconceived as one involving the different values attached to the infliction of
different harms: Holocaust survivors are harmed by the trivialization of their experi-
ence; women, blacks, gays, and other minorities are harmed by the epithets and in-
sults directed at them on many campuses. It is just that as Time sees it, the potential
harm to Holocaust survivors is more worthy of concern than the potential harm to the
sensibilities for minority students; and that is why statements demeaning to Holocaust
survivors are categorized as "inflammatory rhetoric" while language demeaning to
women, blacks, etc. is categorized as the protected exercise of freedom of expression.
The moral is unmistakable; whether or not an assaultive form of speech is tolerated or
regulated will depend on whether or not the group it harms is in a position to com-
mand either the affection or the respect of the society.
Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too (unpublished
draft, on file with the authors). From this moral, Fish draws the appropriate conclusion: "If you
wish to enjoy the protection of society against the verbal harms others may inflict on you, you
must become a group the society takes seriously, either because it loves you or fears you." Id.
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"ideas" (as opposed to "actions" or "fighting words") are cordoned
off and given a domain of their own which then, so everyone as-
sumes, deserves protection, Theoretically, this protection is normally
thought to be the job of constitutional law, but, as was evident at
Duke, it is a job that many people and organizations in American
society have internalized and taken on as their own. In this sense,
the Constitution's rhetoric on free speech has certainly performed its
pedagogical task - all too well, as we see it. For now we have a
private sphere not only of speech and ideas, but also (as George
Will might put it) of "mere speech" and "mere ideas," of speech
and ideas understood apart from any substantive account of the
good which they serve. The upshot is that our society is now marked
by a pervasive form of indifferentism as regards speech.
When the indifferentism inevitably ensues when speech is consid-
ered apart from the good, "freedom of speech" enjoys protection in
the United States according to arbitrary patterns of political influ-
ence and power as much as according to any consistent application
of constitutional principles. Moreover, the rhetoric of free speech in
this context can be put to dangerous purposes. Many Jews and
others at Duke came to recognize this in the fall of 1991. Catherine
MacKinnon and other feminist theorists have been arguing the same
point for some time. 7 We suggest that this ideology can also be of
great danger to Christians, not only in relation to freedom of speech,
but also, in an even more destructive way, in relation to freedom of
religion. For just as "freedom of speech" has paved the way for an
indifferentism about speech in America, likewise "freedom of reli-
gion" has paved the way for "religious indifferentism."
III. How "FREEDOM OF RELIGION" DEGENERATES INTO
RELIGIOUS INDIFFERENTISM
In light of this last claim about religious indifferentism, the name
that often comes to mind is John Courtney Murray, the great apolo-
gist of the "American compromise." Murray is currently celebrated
both by Catholic liberals and Catholic neo-conservatives as the one
who single-handedly turned the church around regarding religious
freedom in general and American democracy in particular. Specifi-
cally, Murray is lauded for securing a distinction between the public
profession of religion of a given society and the care (or establish-
27. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
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ment) of religion by the state within that society. But there is an
aspect of Murray's thought which Murray-ites of virtually all per-
suasions (liberal, conservative, and in-between) neglect to take seri-
ously. We refer to Murray's enduring belief that any society is best
which worships the true God and cleaves to the good, and his fear
that when this is not acknowledged the result is religious indifferent-
ism. 28 Ironically, Murray exemplified this problem as he sought to
preclude the state from tending to any aspect of the care of religion,
while at the same time insisting that the state protect the public
morality. The tension is irresolvable.
The deep ambiguity of Murray's project has been brought to light
by Keith Pavlischek who makes clear that Murray tried to have
things both ways.29 Pavlischek points out that while Murray de-
fended the First Amendment as a necessary pragmatic accommoda-
tion in the face of America's religious pluralism," he would not in
principle exclude the possibility that the state might be competent to
speak in religious matters. For if, Pavlischek reasons, the citizens of
a given society determine to restrict the activity of what they take to
be false religion, and if they do so through due process and out of
concern for the well-being of the temporal order (e.g., if they want
to curb the spread of religiously based polygamy), then there is
nothing in Murray's argument to provide a basis for prohibiting
such a development.". Pavlischek thus notes the arbitrariness in
Murray's a priori claim that the state is incompetent in religious
matters. 2
The problem, Pavlischek argues, lies in the very structure of Mur-
ray's categories. Take, for instance, the distinction Murray made
between direct and indirect influence of the church on the state and
civil society. Pavlischek notes that Murray consistently insisted that
the church, as mediated through the Christian conscience, could and
should wield influence in the temporal realm so as to bring it into
harmony with universal moral order; thus he stipulated that the
state is incompetent to speak on contentious "religious matters."
28. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, Si.., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).
29. KEITH PAVLISCHEK, THE DILEMMA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE
WORK OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J. 217 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Pittsburgh) (forthcoming as a book from Thomas Jefferson University Press).
30. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 28, at 45-78.
31. PAVLISCHEK, supra note 29, at 217.
32. Id. at 218.
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And yet at the same time Murray refused to give a merely proce-
dural or functionalist (Rawlsian) account of the state. Pavlischek
explains the intractability of this dilemma:
The crucial issue revolved around the extent to which a society should strive
to bring the juridical order into harmony with the moral order, which in
Catholic thought could not be totally abstracted from its own revelationally
grounded truth claims. More precisely, it involved the extent to which a
society should strive to bring the juridical order into harmony with the
moral order if certain conditions were to hold. The traditionalists simply
held that if Catholic hegemony obtained, the state ought to be confessional.
Murray conceded to his traditionalist opponents that Catholic-Christian so-
ciety is a good, indeed a "good of the highest order," but at the same time
wanted to remove the state out of positive concern for that good. Consist-
ently carried out, this would put the state out of the virtue-creating business
altogether. The state would indeed be a purely functional state, a position
that Murray, as a Thomist, could not accept."
Pavlischek concludes, in other words, that try as he might, Murray
could not have it both ways.
It is important to note that this was not due to any shortcoming of
Murray. On the contrary, Murray's ability to perceive this dilemma
and wrestle with it was but an indication of his high intellectual
stature in comparison to that of his detractors, whose more blunt-
edged analysis remained incognizant of it. Moreover, we want to
make it crystal clear that Murray's dilemma was not simply the re-
sult of the institutionalization of the liberal (and supposedly limited)
state. Rather Murray's inability to resolve the tension between
Christianity and the state was due to the nature of Christian convic-
tions. Inherent in Christian convictions is a substantive account of
the good, and this account-of the good cannot be held in abeyance
while determining the moral character of a given political arrange-
ment. Thus, there is an inherent tension between the Christian ac-
count of the good and all so-called political accounts of the good.
This tension has been captured nicely by Charles Taylor in an
essay entitled Religion in a Free Society. 4 Taylor argues that "the
Christian Church gave its members a universal allegiance, which
could easily conflict with, or at least rival their political ties.""a The
political ties with which Christianity originally conflicted were asso-
33. Id.
34. Charles Taylor, Religion in a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE:
THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 93 (James Davison
Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
35. Id. at 100.
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ciated with civic republicanism. Christianity, Taylor points out,
"tended to preach against the warrior virtues, which were often cen-
tral to the patriotism of early republics. The ideal citizen of an an-
cient republic was also a warrior."36 The ideal citizen of heaven was
anything but a warrior, or else a warrior in a remarkably different
sense. "The result," Taylor observes, "was a certain distance be-
tween Christianity and the republican tradition," and then Taylor
elaborates:
A writer like Machiavelli, who has to be seen in this light, wondered
whether Christianity as against the ancient pagan religions was not an ele-
ment of potential corruption in a republic. And not only Machiavelli, who
might be thought to be specially anti-Christian: Rousseau had similar
doubts, although he was more embarrassed about them. From the Christian
side, the insistence on some distinction between church and state seemed to
render impossible the kind of fusion between polis and religious community
that was normal in the ancient world.37
Because it is impossible to fuse the polis and the religious commu-
nity, church-state relations, says Taylor , are irremediably marked
by tension and irresolution. He refers to it as a "malaise" and re-
marks that "[i]t is one of the legacies of Christendom that religion
can neither be fully integrated in nor fully excluded from the
state." 8
Taylor observes that the United States is the one polity which has
attempted to bring together Christianity and the republican tradi-
tion.39 The political and cultural ethos of the founding of America
was marked by a unique mix of republican virtue and Christian rec-
titude. Granted, there were differences among orthodox Christians
from New England and "the more urbane deists" from Virginia, but
amid the differences, Taylor argues, there was a shared religious
consciousness and a core of common values which issued forth in a
political arrangement that enabled people to do two things at once:
on the one hand, they were able to be part of the new republic and
to share in its common values, including its religions, while on the
other hand, they were able to participate in their own particular
confessional church.4 0 As Taylor describes it:
To the extent that freedom was seen as part of what God destined for
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Id. at 101-02.
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humans, one could be playing a part in God's purposes as a citizen outside
of any denomination, even as one did as a worshiper in one's particular
church. Many Americans could feel related to God in one way through the
state, as much as they related to Him in a rather different way through the
church congregation 1
Thus, there were two spheres in which people in America were able
to be "religious," one in their own specific confessional or denomina-
tional context, the other in an expressly nonspecific national context.
Taylor acknowledges that this unspecified, civically-sponsored "god"
was not always in the forefront of people's religious consciousness:
But it comes out in moments of crisis and high significance, as one would
expect. Think of the invocations of God on the occasion of great decisions by
Abraham Lincoln . . .during the Civil War. The God invoked at these mo-
ments was a nonconfessional God, no church's property (though sometimes
foreigners might feel that He belonged to the Republic)."
The purpose of Taylor's article is to emphasize how the separa-
tion of church and state was not designed to preclude "God" or "re-
ligion"'from public life, and to make the case against the contempo-
rary proponents of what he calls "liberal freedom," that "God" and
"religion" need not, and ought not, be excluded or "sidelined" from
public life, which, as Taylor has it, would erode "civic freedom." In
other words, Taylor pits "liberal freedom" against "civic freedom"
and contends that in these days of individualism and privatization,
we have too much of the former and need more of the latter.4
We think Taylor is wrong to pit "liberal" against "civic" free-
dom, for they are but two sides of the same coin made necessary by
the kind of political arrangement we call the United States of
America. Moreover, insofar as that political arrangement under-
writes a "nonconfessional God" and a nonecclesial version of Chris-
tianity, it runs into profound conflict with Christianity. When
"Christianity" becomes separable from the social form in which it is
to be embodied, two things happen: (1) Christian belief gets located
in an interior, asocial sphere, "the heart" or "conscience" or some
other private (i.e., nonpublic) space, and thus degenerates into
"mere belief"; and (2) in consequence of the first, a "public" space
is cleared away for a counterfeit form of "religion" to emerge that is
said to be "common" and thus becomes "the religion of the nation."
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 104-13.
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What gets obscured in this arrangement is the possibility of a Chris-
tianity, the material form of which is located neither in a private
space nor in a general public space, but in the body of believers, in
the church. Only within this ecclesial context, that is, only within a
context in which the social landscape is imbued with the presence of
Christ, can Christianity emerge as an alternative both to liberal
freedom and civic freedom and, more generally, to the political pro-
ject we call the United States of America.
In reference to the nonconfessional, nonecclesial god-of-the-na-
tion, Taylor points out that "[t]he great majority of American Prot-
estants had no difficulty accommodating the God so invoked with
the one they worshiped on Sunday in their respective congrega-
tions."4 And then he remarks that, "Catholics had greater
problems, but then American Catholicism has been remade by this
experience." 4 5 We find this last remark to be significant. It has been
precisely because Catholicism has had an ecclesially grounded un-
derstanding of Christianity that it had "greater problems" adapting
to America's god-of-the-nation. Yet insofar as "American Catholi-
cism has been" - or is being - "remade by this experience," Ca-
tholicism has lost (or is losing) its strong sense of the inherently
social character of Christianity.
Put differently, in their embrace of the American experiment,
Catholics have learned to adapt to a political landscape marked by
religious indifferentism. Furthermore, Catholics have been aided in
this adaptation to indifferentism by Murray's successors, who have
far too readily appropriated the kind of procedural liberalism to
which Murray was so averse. Rather than advance this claim, how-
ever, we will provide an alternative vision to the political vision of
America, one that is shaped by the acknowledgement that true po-
litical authority is to be found not in any republican virtues, new or
ancient, nor in any set of governmental procedures, but in Jesus
Christ who is our true King.
44. Id. at 102-03.
45. Id. at 103.
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IV. PIuS XI: WHY BELIEF Is NOT ENOUGH
It is no coincidence that when Francis J. Connell opposed Mur-
ray's revision of the traditional church-state doctrine on the grounds
that it would breed indifferentism among Catholics, he employed
the image of Christ the King." In doing so, Connell was invoking
the authority of Pius XI, who had established the feast of Christ the
King in 1925 with the encyclical Quas Primas 7
In Quas Primas, Pius XI has no use for refining abstract distinc-
tions between "belief" and "conduct," nor for positing the "individ-
ual conscience" as the site of "religious freedom." Rather, he boldly
and bluntly asserts the importance of publicly recognizing and cele-
brating the Kingship of Christ in reconstituting the entire social or-
der. Reflecting on the title "Christ the King," Pius XI acknowledges
that it has often been interpreted metaphorically: Christ exercises
reign over our minds, our wills, our hearts, and so draws us along
the path of perfection." "But, if we ponder this matter more
deeply," the pope points out, "we cannot but see that the title and
power of King belong to Christ as man in the strict and proper
sense no less." 49 The pope's reasoning, based on the Nicene doctrine
of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father (the church was
celebrating the 1600th anniversary of Nicaea that year), was that if
Christ became one of us, then he (like us) was embodied; and if
Christ is King, then his kingdom is embodied as well.50 Or to put it
conversely, Christ's kingship cannot be confined to some interior,
privatized, spiritual realm; it is social, material, and (in the fullest
sense of the word) political.
The political point that Pius XI wanted to drive home in institut-
ing the feast was that the common good is to be defined by Christ.
This is why the pope writes of the "lordship of Christ" in terms of
"a threefold power" coinciding with the legislative, judicial, and ex-
46. See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., Christ the King of Civil Rulers, 119 AM. ECCLESIASTICAL
REV. 244 (1948); Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R,, The Theory of the "Lay State," 125 AM. ECCLESI-
ASTICAL REV, 7 (1951).
47. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical on The Kingship of Christ (Quas Primas. December 11, 1925),
reprinted in 2 SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS: EIGHTEEN ENCYCLICALS OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 30
(Joseph Husslein, S.J. ed., 1942) [hereinafter Quas Primas]. Portions of these reflections on the
feast of Christ the King and on Quas Primas appeared in Michael J. Baxter, C.S.C., Dominion
Over All, Markings, Nov. 24, 1991.
48. Quas Primas. supra note 47, at 32.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 45-46.
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ecutive powers of government.5 Against the effort of governments
to privatize Christian discipleship or eliminate it altogether, and
even against Christians and Catholics who tend toward proffering a
purely "spiritual" understanding of the kingdom, Pius XI insists
that the kingdom is also, in the formal sense, "civil." "It would be a
grave error . . ., " he writes, "to say that Christ has no authority
whatever in civil affairs, since by virtue of the absolute empire over
all creatures committed to Him by the Father, all things are in His
power. ,,51
Elaborating on the power of Christ to pervade and influence all
creation, the pope explains:
Nor is there any difference in this matter between the individual and the
family or the state; for all men, whether collectively or individually, are
under the dominion of Christ. In Him is the salvation of the individual, in
Him is the salvation of society. . . . He is the author of happiness and true
prosperity for every man and for every nation. "For a nation is happy when
its citizens are happy. What else is a nation but a number of men living in
concord?""
Conceptually, this is a most remarkable assertion, for the pope is
dissolving several of the leading antinomies of modern social theory,
individual/society, individual/state, and individual/family antino-
mies, much in the way that Augustine dissolved the antinomies that
shaped antique political theory.54 Pius XI thus arrayed himself and
the Church against the tendency in secular social theory to create
spheres whereby Christ's Kingship is confined to "the soul," "the
individual," or at best "the family," and is thereby prevented from
directly shaping "the political," "the social," and "the economic."
The antipathy that Pius XI held for secular theory is perhaps no-
where more clearly exhibited than in his story of the rise of the
liberal (or "laicist") state. "Anticlericalism" or, to use a clearer
word, "secularism" 55 has become a plague on modern politics, an
51. Id. at 35-36.
52. Id. at 36.
53. Id. at 37 (quoting St. Augustine).
54. For an account of Augustine's dissolution of the antinomies of antique theory, see JOHN
MILBANK. THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY BEYOND SECULAR REASONING 403-06 (1991).
55. Husslein's translation uses the word "anticlericalism." In another translation, "secularism"
is used. See Rt. Rev. Msgr. P.E. Hallett, Forward to I SELECTED PAPAL ENCYCLICALS AND LET-
TERS, 1896-1931, at 3-23 (1939). We think "secularism" is the better word here because it is clear
that Pius XI is referring to certain theoretical trends and not just the church hierarchy, which is
what the word "anticlericalism" usually implies today.
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"evil spirit." 56 The pope recalls that:
This evil spirit . . . has not come into being in one day, it has long lurked
beneath the surface. The empire of Christ over all nations was rejected. The
right which the Church has from Christ Himself, to teach mankind, to make
laws, to govern peoples in all that pertains to their eternal salvation, that
right was denied. Then gradually the religion of Christ came to be likened
to false religions and to be placed ignominiously on the same level with
them. It was then put under the power of the state and merely tolerated
more or less at the whim of princes and rulers. Some men went even further,
and wished to set up in the place of God's religion a natural religion, con-
sisting in some instinctive affection of the heart. There were even some na-
tions who thought they could dispense with God, and their religion should
consist in impiety, and the neglect of God.5
7
Here we have, to say the least, a different narrative than George
Will's. Will commends the Founders of the new Republic for exer-
cising "cool realism and secularism" in setting up a political ar-
rangement, a "central purpose" of which is "the subordination of
religion to the political order."5 8 Pius XI sees such a subordination
as the undoing of any true politics. Thus he continues his narrative
by noting that:
The rebellion of individuals and states against the authority of Christ has
produced deplorable consequences. We lamented them in the Encyclical Ubi
Arcano; We lament them today. They are the seeds of discords sown far and
wide; those bitter enmities and rivalries between nations which hinder so
much the cause of peace; that insatiable greed which is so often hidden
under a pretense of public spirit and patriotism, and gives rise to so many
private quarrels; a blind and immoderate selfishness making men seek noth-
ing but their own comfort and advantage, and measure everything by these
59
Here again, whereas George Will praises the Founders for seeking
to "domesticate religious passions" by directing people's efforts to-
ward establishing "a commercial republic - capitalism" and for
aiming "to submerge people's turbulent energies in self-interested
pursuit of material comforts,"60 Pius XI condemns modern political
orders for cultivating "a blind and immoderate selfishness making
men seek nothing but their own comfort and advantage, and mea-
sure everything by these ... ." He links this "insatiable greed"
56. Quas Primas, supra note 47, at 41.
57. id.
58. Will, supra note 1, at B7.
59. Quas Primas, supra note 47, at 41.
60. Will, supra note 1, at B7.
61. Quas Primas, supra note 47, at 41.
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to "a pretense of public spirit and patriotism."ea
Interestingly, both George Will and Pius XI see acquisitiveness as
central to their social analysis; but whereas Will sees as it as a so-
cial virtue, Pius XI sees it, rightly, as a social vice. His point on this
score is crucial: Societies constituted on acquisitiveness cannot help
but be imprisoned within perpetual conflict and violence.
In the face of the deleterious political, economic, and social forces
of the day, Pius XI insisted, in rather startling language, that peace
among nations can only be re-established through "the restoration
of the Empire of Our Lord." 3 The Kingship of Christ, for Pius XI,
was the alternative to the New World Order that was emerging in
the mid-1920s. We believe that the Kingship of Christ is the alter-
native to the New World Order that is emerging today. We have
quoted so profusely from Quas Primas because Pius XI resists the
temptation to conceive of politics as a procedural arrangement
which precludes any strong account of the good. Put differently,
Pius XI resists the urge to conceive of politics in anything less than
soteriological terms. Separating politics from soteriology has become
the norm among theologians today, but as we see it, this only lays
the theoretical groundwork for religious indifferentism, for assuming
that we can discern political apart from the Christ. And this, in
turn, paves the way for what we Christians must regard as a truly
frightening national agenda - domesticating religious passion, sub-
merging people's energy in the self-interested pursuit of material
comfort, constructing an arrangement in which religion is subordi-
nated to the political order. Yet frightening as it is, this national
agenda seems to have impressed Christians in America all too well
during the recent Gulf War.
V. A CALL TO WORSHIP
We confess to offering little in the way of juridical steps for
resolving the problem of the relationship between church and state
in America. Indeed, we are not concerned with positing any theories
of "the state" at all, for we have found that when "the state" is
given theoretical status in the abstract sense, this too often paves the
way for underwriting very concrete forms of violence. Thus during
the Gulf War, for example, John Neuhaus wrote of how the demo-
62. id.
63. Id. at 30.
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cratic nations of the West would continue to conflict with those Is-
lamic nations who refused to provide basic human rights for their
people." ' We find a chilling irony operating in such statements:
Arab nations are "repressive" in as much as they establish Islam as
the state religion, and purportedly Christian nations are ready to
discipline them militarily unless and until they convert and become
democratic. In light of this logic of the New World Order, our pri-
mary concern is to help Christians recover, both in theory and in
practice, the habits we need in order to resist a state whose power
remains virtually unchecked precisely because it alleges to be consti-
tutionally limited.
Toward this end, we take it that one of the more hopeful political
tasks for the Catholic Church in America these days would be to
make the Feast of Christ the King as attractive and important for
as many as possible. The potential of the liturgy to be a formative
power in people's lives should not be overlooked, for as Pius XI
explained:
[Pleople are instructed in the truths of faith and brought to appreciate the
inner joys of religion far more effectually by the annual celebration of our
sacred mysteries than by any official pronouncements of the teaching of the
Church. Such pronouncements usually reach only a few and the more
learned among the faithful; feasts reach them all. The former speak but
once, the latter speak every year - in fact, forever. The Church's teaching
affects the mind primarily; her feasts affect both mind and heart, and have
a salutary effect upon the whole of man's nature. Man is composed of body
and soul, and he needs these external festivities so that the sacred rites, in
all their beauty and variety, may stimulate him to drink more deeply of the
fountain of God's teaching, that he make it a part of himself . . .65
We realize that such a call to worship will come off to many peo-
ple, especially academics, as quaint at best. And we are well aware
that our use of Pius XI in general will be judged by many to be less
than "serious" because it does not tackle the complex legal issues
attending church-state relations in this country.66 To these criticisms
64. Richard John Neuhaus, Civilizations in Conflict, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1991, at A18.
65. Quas Primas, supra note 47, at 39.
66. In a letter responding to this Essay our friend Tom Shaffer observed, "It is no surprise to
me that the lawyers at DePaul did not like your freedom-of-religion paper. I did, and that gives
you one midwestern lawyer to claim as a fan. I think the dissonance has to do with perception;
there is something about looking at religion through a constitutional-law lens that makes even a
faithful believer define the issues as the government defines them, as if the church were an in-
truder on the governmental enterprise. That is really astounding when you consider that the be-
liever-lawyer goes right on being a churchperson and, in other ways, proclaiming the Kingdom."
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we have two responses. First, we write not as apologists for the lib-
eral project as does George Will, nor as theorists groping for a way
to make peace with the nation-state, but as theologians of a church
constituted by a politics that acknowledges Christ as King. And sec-
ond, what Pius XI said of the Church's teaching could also be said
of papers delivered by theologians at academic conferences: "Such
pronouncements usually reach only a few and the more learned
among the faithful; feasts reach them all."
Finally, we are aware that some will infer from what we have
written that we favor some kind of restoration of "the confessional
state." We favor no such restoration. However, we do favor restor-
ing a theoretical commitment to grounding politics in the christolog-
ical claim that Christ is King. While we find Francis J. Connell's
christology to have been inadequate (Murray was probably right to
accuse him of being a "crypto-monarchist" 7 ), we find the christolo-
gies of Murray's successors, both liberal and neo-conservative, to be
inadequate as well; indeed they are nonexistent. So we have wanted
to underscore that Christians are called first and foremost not to
resolve the tension between church and state, but to acknowledge
the Kingship of Christ in their lives, which means leaving church-
- state relations profoundly unresolved, until the day when He comes
again in glory.
Perhaps the political form this irresolution takes can be alluded to
in the life of Father Max Josef Metzger (1887-1944). After serving
as military chaplain in the German Army in World War I, Metzger
became a tireless worker in the cause of peace. 8 After being in con-
tact with the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and attend-
ing many peace conferences and congresses, Metzger founded a Sec-
ular Institute, the Society of Christ the King, which was devoted to
the lay apostolate and the works of mercy, and particularly to the
cause of international peace. 9 Metzger was also deeply committed
to the Catholic ecumenical movement and was a founding member
of Una Sancta. Metzger was arrested and jailed by the Gestapo
three times before his final imprisonment in 1943. Metzger's
"crime" was that he had contacted bishops in Allied countries in the
67. John Courtney Murray, S.J., For the Freedom and Transcendence of the Church, 126 AM.
ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 28, 43 (1952).
68. THOMAS MERTON, THE NONVIOLENT ALTERNATIVE 140-41 (Gordon C. Zahn ed., rev. ed.
of THOMAS MERTON ON PEACE 1980).
69. Id. at 141.
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hope that they could influence their governments to seek a negoti-
ated peace rather than unconditional surrender.7 0 This the Nazi
government considered to be treasonous, so Metzger was executed
on April 17, 1944. As Thomas Merton has written, "Father Metz-
ger did not believe in power, in bombs. He believed in Christ, in
unity, in peace. He died as a martyr for his belief .. ."7 - which
thankfully consisted of much more than "mere belief." Metzger's
life demonstrates that "making peace" with the polities of this world
is not the first task of a Church that worships Christ the King. Our
first task rather is to embody Christ's kingdom, and thus to make
good on the prayer after communion for the feast of Christ the
King:
Lord, You give us Christ, the King of all creation, as food for everlasting
life. Help us to live by His gospel and bring us to the joy of kingdom, where
He lives and reigns for ever and ever.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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